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Abstract
In this paper, first, we investigate the model of degraded broadcast channel with side information and confidential
messages. This work is from Steinberg’s work on the degraded broadcast channel with causal and noncausal side
information, and Csisza´r-Ko¨rner’s work on broadcast channel with confidential messages. Inner and outer bounds
on the capacity-equivocation regions are provided for the noncausal and causal cases. Superposition coding and
double-binning technique are used in the corresponding achievability proofs.
Then, we investigate the degraded broadcast channel with side information, confidential messages and noiseless
feedback. The noiseless feedback is from the non-degraded receiver to the channel encoder. Inner and outer bounds
on the capacity-equivocation region are provided for the noncausal case, and the capacity-equivocation region is
determined for the causal case. Compared with the model without feedback, we find that the noiseless feedback helps
to enlarge the inner bounds for both causal and noncausal cases. In the achievability proof of the feedback model,
the noiseless feedback is used as a secret key shared by the non-degraded receiver and the transmitter, and therefore,
the code construction for the feedback model is a combination of superposition coding, Gel’fand-Pinsker’s binning,
block Markov coding and Ahlswede-Cai’s secret key on the feedback system.
Index Terms
Confidential message, capacity-equivocation region, degraded broadcast channel, noiseless feedback, secrecy
capacity, side information.
I. INTRODUCTION
Equivocation was first introduced into channel coding by Wyner in his study of wiretap channel [15]. It is a kind
of degraded broadcast channels. The object is to transmit messages to the legitimate receiver, while keeping the
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2wiretapper as ignorant of the messages as possible. After the publication of Wyner’s work, Csisza´r and Ko¨rner [4]
investigated a more general situation: the broadcast channels with confidential messages, see Figure 1. The model
of [4] is to transmit confidential messages to receiver 1 at rate R1 and common messages to both receivers at
rate R0, while keeping receiver 2 as ignorant of the confidential messages as possible. Measuring ignorance by
equivocation, a single-letter characterization of all the achievable triples (R1, Re, R0) was provided in [4], where Re
is the second receiver’s equivocation to the confidential messages. Note that the model of [4] is also a generalization
of [8], where no confidentiality condition is imposed. In addition, Merhav [11] studied a specified wiretap channel,
and obtained the capacity region, where both the legitimate receiver and the wiretapper have access to some leaked
symbols from the source, but the channels for the wiretapper are more noisy than the legitimate receiver, which
shares a secret key with the encoder.
Fig. 1: Broadcast channels with confidential messages
In communication systems there is often a feedback link from the receiver to the transmitter,e.g. the two-way
channels for telephone connections. It is well known that feedback does not increase the capacity of discrete
memoryless channel (DMC). However, does the feedback increase the capacity region of the wiretap channel? In
order to solve this problem, Ahlswede and Cai studied the general wiretap channel (the wiretap channel does not
need to be degraded) with noiseless feedback from the legitimate receiver [1], and both upper and lower bounds
of the secrecy capacity were provided. Specifically, for the degraded case, they showed that the secrecy capacity
is larger than that of Wyner’s wiretap channel (without feedback). In the achievability proof, Ahlswede and Cai
[1] used the noiseless feedback as a secret key shared by the transmitter and the legitimate receiver, while the
wiretapper had no additional knowledge about the key except his own received symbols. Besides Ahlswede and
Cai’s work, the wiretap channel with noisy feedback was studied in [10], and the wiretap channel with secure
rate-limited feedback was studied in [2], and both of them focused on bounds of the secrecy capacity.
The coding for channels with causal side information at the encoder was first investigated by Shannon [13] in
1958. After that, in order to solve the problem of coding for a computer memory with defective cells, Kuznetsov and
Tsybakov [9] considered a channel in the presence of noncausal side information at the transmitter. They provided
some coding techniques without determination of the capacity. The capacity was found in 1980 by Gel’fand and
Pinsker [7]. Furthermore, Costa [6] investigated a power-constrained additive noise channel, where part of the
noise is known at the transmitter as side information. This channel is also called dirty paper channel. Based on
the dirty paper channel, C. Mitrpant et al. [12] studied the Gaussian wiretap channel with side information, and
provided an inner bound on the capacity-equivocation region. Furthermore, Y. Chen et al. [3] investigated the
3discrete memoryless wiretap channel with noncausal side information, and also provided an inner bound on the
capacity-equivocation region. Note that the coding scheme of [3] is a combination of those in [7], [15]. In order
to introduce side information to the broadcast channel, Steinberg investigated the degraded broadcast channel with
side information [14], where both causal and noncausal side information were considered in his paper. Specifically,
inner and outer bounds on capacity region were provided for the degraded broadcast channel with noncausal side
information [14], and meanwhile, the capacity region of the degraded broadcast channel with causal side information
was totally determined [14].
In this paper, we study the model of degraded broadcast channel with side information, confidential messages and
with or without noiseless feedback (see Figure 2). The model of this paper is from Steinberg’s work on degraded
broadcast channel with side information at the encoder, and the model of broadcast channel with confidential
messages provided by Csisza´r and Ko¨rner. In Figure 2, S is the confidential message sent to receiver 1, and T is
the common message sent to both receiver 1 and receiver 2. The transition probability of channel 1 depends on the
side information V N , and V N is available to the channel encoder in a causal or noncausal manner. Receiver 2 can
get a degraded version of Y N via channel 2. In addition, there may exist a noiseless feedback from the output of
channel 1 to the channel encoder.
Fig. 2: Degraded broadcast channel with side information, confidential messages and with or without noiseless
feedback
In this paper, random variab1es, sample values and alphabets are denoted by capital letters, lower case letters
and calligraphic letters, respectively. A similar convention is applied to the random vectors and their sample values.
For example, UN denotes a random N -vector (U1, ..., UN ), and uN = (u1, ..., uN ) is a specific vector value
in UN that is the N th Cartesian power of U . UNi denotes a random N − i + 1-vector (Ui, ..., UN ), and
uNi = (ui, ..., uN ) is a specific vector value in UNi . Let pV (v) denote the probability mass function Pr{V = v}.
Throughout the paper, the logarithmic function is to the base 2.
The organization of this paper is as follows. In Section II, inner and outer bounds on the capacity-equivocation
regions of the model of Figure 2 without feedback are provided by Theorem 1 to Theorem 4. Specifically, the inner
and outer bounds for the model of Figure 2 with noncausal side information and without feedback are provided in
Theorem 1 and Theorem 2, respectively. The inner and outer bounds for the model with causal side information and
without feedback are provided in Theorem 3 and Theorem 4, respectively. In Section III, inner and outer bounds on
4the capacity-equivocation region of the model of Figure 2 with noncausal side information and noiseless feedback
are provided in Theorem 5 and Theorem 6, respectively. The capacity-equivocation region of the model with causal
side information and noiseless feedback is given in Theorem 7. Section IV is for a binary example about the model
of Figure 2 with causal side information and noiseless feedback. Final conclusions are provided in Section V.
II. THE MODEL OF FIGURE 2 WITHOUT FEEDBACK
In this section, the model of Figure 2 without feedback is considered into two parts. The model of Figure 2 with
noncausal side information and without feedback is described in Subsection II-A, and the model of Figure 2 with
causal side information and without feedback is described in Subsection II-B, see the following.
A. The Model of Figure 2 with Noncausal Side Information and without Feedback
In this subsection, a description of the model of Figure 2 with noncausal side information and without feedback is
given by Definition 1 to Definition 5. The inner and outer bounds on the capacity-equivocation regionR(n) composed
of all achievable (R0, R1, Re) triples are in Theorem 1 and Theorem 2, where the achievable (R0, R1, Re) triple
is defined in Definition 6.
Definition 1: (Channel encoder) The confidential message S takes values in S , and the common message T
takes values in T . S and T are independent and uniformly distributed over their ranges. V N is the side information
of channel 1, and it is the output of a discrete memoryless source pV (v). In addition, V N is available to the channel
encoder in a noncausal manner. Note that V N is independent of S and T . At the i-th time, the inputs of the channel
encoder are S, T and V N , while the output is Xi, i.e., the channel encoder is a mapping
fi : S × T × VN → Xi, (2.1)
where fi(s, t, vN ) = xi ∈ X , s ∈ S, t ∈ T and vN ∈ VN . The transmission rates of the confidential message and
the common message are log‖S‖N and
log‖T ‖
N , respectively.
Definition 2: (Channel 1) Channel 1 is a DMC with finite input alphabet X × V , finite output alphabet Y , and
transition probability Q1(y|x, v), where x ∈ X , v ∈ V, y ∈ Y . Q1(yN |xN , vN ) =
∏N
n=1Q1(yn|xn, vn). The inputs
of Channel 1 are XN and V N , while the output is Y N .
Definition 3: (Channel 2) Channel 2 is a DMC with finite input alphabet Y , finite output alphabet Z , and
transition probability Q2(z|y), where y ∈ Y, z ∈ Z . Q2(zN |yN ) =
∏N
n=1Q2(zn|yn). The inputs of Channel 2 is
Y N , while the output is ZN . Receiver 2’s equivocation to the confidential message is defined as
∆ =
1
N
H(S|ZN ). (2.2)
The cascade of Channel 1 and Channel 2 is another DMC with transition probability
Q3(z|x, v) =
∑
y∈Y
QW (z|y)QM (y|x, v). (2.3)
Definition 4: (Decoder 1) Decoder 1 is a mapping fD1 : YN → S × T , with input Y N and outputs Ŝ, T̂ . Let
Pe1 be the error probability of receiver 1 , and it is defined as Pr{(S, T ) 6= (Ŝ, T̂ )}.
5Definition 5: (Decoder 2) Decoder 2 is a mapping fD2 : ZN → T , with input ZN and output T˜ . Let Pe2 be
the error probability of receiver 2 , and it is defined as Pr{T 6= T˜}.
Definition 6: (Achievable (R0, R1, Re) triple in the model of Figure 2 with noncausal side information and
without feedback) A triple (R0, R1, Re) (where R0, R1, Re > 0) is called achievable if, for any  > 0 (where  is
an arbitrary small positive real number and  → 0), there exists a channel encoder-decoder (N,∆, Pe1, Pe2) such
that
lim
N→∞
log ‖ T ‖
N
= R0, lim
N→∞
log ‖ S ‖
N
= R1, lim
N→∞
∆ ≥ Re, Pe1 ≤ , Pe2 ≤ . (2.4)
The following Theorem 1 and Theorem 2 provide inner and outer bounds on the capacity-equivocation region
R(n) for the model of Figure 2 with noncausal side information and without feedback, and they are proved in
Appendix A and Appendix B.
Theorem 1: A single-letter characterization of the region R(ni) is as follows,
R(ni) = {(R0, R1, Re) : 0 ≤ Re ≤ R1,
R0 ≤ I(U ;Z)− I(U ;V ),
R1 ≤ I(K;Y |U)− I(K;V |U),
Re ≤ I(K;Y |U)− I(K;Z|U)},
where pUKVXY Z(u, k, v, x, y, z) = pZ|Y (z|y)pY |X,V (y|x, v)pUKXV (u, k, x, v), which implies that (U,K) →
(X,V )→ Y → Z.
The region R(ni) satisfies R(ni) ⊆ R(n).
Remark 1: There are some notes on Theorem 1, see the following.
• The region R(ni) is convex, and the proof is directly obtained by introducing a time sharing random variable
into Theorem 1, and therefore, we omit the proof here.
• The ranges of the random variables U and K satisfy
‖U‖ ≤ ‖X‖‖V‖+ 2,
‖K‖ ≤ (‖X‖‖V‖+ 2)2.
The proof is in Appendix C.
• Without the secrecy parameter Re, the region R(ni) is exactly the same as the achievable region for the
degraded broadcast channel with noncausal side information [14].
• The points in R(n) for which Re = R1 are of considerable interest, which imply H(S) = H(S|ZN ).
Definition 7: (The secrecy capacity C(n)s ) The secrecy capacity C(n)s of the model of Figure 2 with noncausal
side information and without feedback, is denoted by
C(n)s = max
(R0=0,R1,Re=R1)∈R(n)
R1. (2.5)
6Furthermore, the secrecy capacity C(n)s satisfies
C(n)s ≥ max min{I(K;Y |U)− I(K;Z|U), I(K;Y |U)− I(K;V |U)}. (2.6)
Proof of (2.6): Substituting Re = R1 and R0 = 0 into the region R(ni) in Theorem 1, we have
R1 ≤ I(K;Y |U)− I(K;V |U), (2.7)
R1 ≤ I(K;Y |U)− I(K;Z|U). (2.8)
(2.9)
Note that the triple (R0 = 0, R1 = max min{I(K;Y |U)− I(K;Z|U), I(K;Y |U)− I(K;V |U)}, Re = R1)
is achievable, and therefore, the secrecy capacity C(n)s ≥ max min{I(K;Y |U) − I(K;Z|U), I(K;Y |U) −
I(K;V |U)}. Thus the proof is completed.
Theorem 2: A single-letter characterization of the region R(no) is as follows,
R(no) = {(R0, R1, Re) : 0 ≤ Re ≤ R1,
R0 ≤ I(U ;Z)− I(U ;V ),
R1 ≤ I(K;Y |U,A)− I(K;V |U,A),
R0 +R1 ≤ I(U,A,K;Y )− I(U,A,K;V ),
Re ≤ I(K;Y |U,A)− I(K;V |U,A)− I(K;Z|U) + I(K;V |U)},
where pUKAVXY Z(u, k, a, v, x, y, z) = pZ|Y (z|y)pY |X,V (y|x, v)pUKAXV (u, k, a, x, v), which implies that (U,K,A)→
(X,V )→ Y → Z.
The region R(no) satisfies R(n) ⊆ R(no).
Remark 2: There are some notes on Theorem 2, see the following.
• The region R(no) is convex, and the proof is directly obtained by introducing a time sharing random variable
into Theorem 2, and therefore, we omit the proof here.
• The ranges of the random variables U and K satisfy
‖U‖ ≤ ‖X‖‖V‖+ 2,
‖A‖ ≤ (‖X‖‖V‖+ 2)(‖X‖‖V‖+ 1),
‖K‖ ≤ (‖X‖‖V‖+ 2)(‖X‖‖V‖+ 1)(‖X‖‖V‖+ 2)2.
The proof is similar to the proof of the second part of Remark 1, and it is omitted here.
• Without the secrecy parameter Re, the region R(no) is exactly the same as the outer bound for the degraded
broadcast channel with noncausal side information [14].
7B. The Model of Figure 2 with Causal Side Information and without Feedback
The model of Figure 2 with causal side information and without feedback is similar to the model in Subsection
II-A, except that the side information V N in Definition 1 is known to the channel encoder in a causal manner, i.e.,
at the i-th time (1 ≤ i ≤ N ), the output of the channel encoder xi = fi(s, t, vi), where vi = (v1, v2, ..., vi) and fi
is the mapping at time i. Note that Vi is independent of (Y i−1, T, V Ni+1, Z
i−1), where V Ni+1 = (Vi+1, Vi+2, ..., VN ),
Y i−1 = (Y1, Y2, ..., Yi−1) and Zi−1 = (Z1, Z2, ..., Zi−1).
The following Theorem 3 and Theorem 4 provide inner and outer bounds on the capacity-equivocation region
R(c) for the model of Figure 2 with causal side information and without feedback, and they are proved in Appendix
D and Appendix E.
Theorem 3: A single-letter characterization of the region R(ci) is as follows,
R(ci) = {(R0, R1, Re) : 0 ≤ Re ≤ R1,
R0 ≤ I(U ;Z),
R1 ≤ I(K;Y |U),
Re ≤ I(K;Y |U)− I(K;Z|U)},
where pUKVXY Z(u, k, v, x, y, z) = pZ|Y (z|y)pY |X,V (y|x, v)pX|UKV (x|u, k, v)pUK(u, k)pV (v), which implies
that (U,K)→ (X,V )→ Y → Z and V is independent of U and K.
The region R(ci) satisfies R(ci) ⊆ R(c).
Remark 3: There are some notes on Theorem 3, see the following.
• The region R(ci) is convex, and the proof is omitted here.
• The ranges of the random variables U and K satisfy
‖U‖ ≤ ‖X‖‖V‖+ 1,
‖K‖ ≤ (‖X‖‖V‖+ 1)2.
The proof is similar to the proof of the second part of Remark 1, and it is omitted here.
• Without the secrecy parameter Re, the region R(ci) is exactly the same as the capacity region for the degraded
broadcast channel with causal side information [14].
• The points in R(c) for which Re = R1 are of considerable interest, which imply H(S) = H(S|ZN ).
Definition 8: (The secrecy capacity C(c)s ) The secrecy capacity C(c)s of the model of Figure 2 with causal
side information and without feedback, is denoted by
C(c)s = max
(R0=0,R1,Re=R1)∈R(c)
R1. (2.10)
Furthermore, the secrecy capacity C(c)s satisfies
C(c)s ≥ max(I(K;Y |U)− I(K;Z|U)). (2.11)
8Proof of (2.11): Substituting Re = R1 and R0 = 0 into the region R(ci) in Theorem 3, we have
R1 ≤ I(K;Y |U),
R1 ≤ I(K;Y |U)− I(K;Z|U).
Note that the triple (R0 = 0, R1 = max(I(K;Y |U)− I(K;Z|U)), Re = R1) is achievable, and therefore, the
secrecy capacity C(c)s ≥ max(I(K;Y |U)− I(K;Z|U)). Thus the proof is completed.
Theorem 4: A single-letter characterization of the region R(co) is as follows,
R(co) = {(R0, R1, Re) : 0 ≤ Re ≤ R1,
R0 ≤ I(U ;Z),
R1 ≤ I(K;Y |U),
Re ≤ I(K;Y |U)− I(K;Z|A)},
where pUKAVXY Z(u, k, a, v, x, y, z) = pZ|Y (z|y)pY |X,V (y|x, v)pX|UAKV (x|u, a, k, v)pUKA(u, k, a)pV (v), which
implies that (U,K,A)→ (X,V )→ Y → Z and V is independent of U , K and A.
The region R(co) satisfies R(c) ⊆ R(co).
Remark 4: There are some notes on Theorem 4, see the following.
• The region R(co) is convex, and the proof is omitted here.
• The ranges of the random variables U and K satisfy
‖U‖ ≤ ‖X‖‖V‖+ 1,
‖A‖ ≤ ‖X‖‖V‖,
‖K‖ ≤ (‖X‖‖V‖+ 1)2‖X‖‖V‖.
The proof is similar to the proof of the second part of Remark 1, and it is omitted here.
• Without the secrecy parameter Re, the region R(co) is exactly the same as the capacity region of the degraded
broadcast channel with causal side information [14].
III. THE MODEL OF FIGURE 2 WITH FEEDBACK
In this section, the model of Figure 2 with feedback is considered into two parts. The model of Figure 2 with
noncausal side information and feedback is described in Subsection III-A, and the model of Figure 2 with causal
side information and feedback is described in Subsection III-B, see the following.
A. The Model of Figure 2 with Noncausal Side Information and Feedback
The model of Figure 2 with noncausal side information and feedback is similar to the model in Subsection
II-A, except that there is a noiseless feedback from receiver 1 to the channel encoder. The feedback Y i−1 (where
2 ≤ i ≤ N and Y i−1 takes values in Yi−1) is the previous i − 1 time output of channel 1. At the i-th time,
9the inputs of the channel encoder are S, T , Y i−1 and V N , while the output is Xi, i.e., the channel encoder is a
mapping
fi : S × T × Yi−1 × VN → Xi, (3.12)
where fi(s, t, yi−1, vN ) = xi ∈ X , s ∈ S, t ∈ T , yi−1 ∈ Yi−1 and vN ∈ VN .
The following Theorem 5 and Theorem 6 provide inner and outer bounds on the capacity-equivocation region
R(nf) for the model of Figure 2 with noncausal side information and feedback, and they are proved in Appendix
F and Appendix G.
Theorem 5: A single-letter characterization of the region R(nfi) is as follows,
R(nfi) = {(R0, R1, Re) : 0 ≤ Re ≤ R1,
R0 ≤ I(U ;Z)− I(U ;V ),
R1 ≤ I(K;Y |U)− I(K;V |U),
Re ≤ H(Y |Z)},
where pUKVXY Z(u, k, v, x, y, z) = pZ|Y (z|y)pY |X,V (y|x, v)pUKXV (u, k, x, v), which implies that (U,K) →
(X,V )→ Y → Z.
The region R(nfi) satisfies R(nfi) ⊆ R(nf).
Remark 5: There are some notes on Theorem 5, see the following.
• The region R(nfi) is convex, and the proof is omitted here.
• The ranges of the random variables U and K satisfy
‖U‖ ≤ ‖X‖‖V‖+ 2,
‖K‖ ≤ (‖X‖‖V‖+ 2)(‖X‖‖V‖+ 1).
The proof is similar to the proof of the second part of Remark 1, and it is omitted here.
• Without the secrecy parameter Re, the region R(nfi) is exactly the same as the achievable region for the
degraded broadcast channel with noncausal side information [14].
• The points in R(nf) for which Re = R1 are of considerable interest, which imply H(S) = H(S|ZN ).
Definition 9: (The secrecy capacity C(nf)s ) The secrecy capacity C(nf)s of the model of Figure 2 with
noncausal side information and feedback, is denoted by
C(nf)s = max
(R0=0,R1,Re=R1)∈R(nf)
R1. (3.13)
Furthermore, the secrecy capacity C(nf)s satisfies
C(nf)s ≥ max min{H(Y |Z), I(K;Y |U)− I(K;V |U)}. (3.14)
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Proof of (3.14): Substituting Re = R1 and R0 = 0 into the region R(nfi) in Theorem 5, we have
R1 ≤ I(K;Y |U)− I(K;V |U),
R1 ≤ H(Y |Z).
Note that the triple (R0 = 0, R1 = max min{H(Y |Z), I(K;Y |U) − I(K;V |U)}, Re = R1) is achievable,
and therefore, the secrecy capacity C(nf)s ≥ max min{H(Y |Z), I(K;Y |U)− I(K;V |U)}. Thus the proof is
completed.
• Note that the formula Re ≤ I(K;Y |U)− I(K;Z|U) of Theorem 1 can be bounded as follows.
Re ≤ I(K;Y |U)− I(K;Z|U)
= H(K|U,Z)−H(K|U, Y )
(a)
= H(K|U,Z)−H(K|U, Y, Z)
= I(K;Y |U,Z) ≤ H(Y |U,Z) ≤ H(Y |Z), (3.15)
where (a) is from K → (U, Y )→ Z.
Formula (3.15) implies that the feedback helps to enlarge the region R(ni) in Theorem 1.
Theorem 6: A single-letter characterization of the region R(nfo) is as follows,
R(nfo) = {(R0, R1, Re) : 0 ≤ Re ≤ R1,
R0 ≤ I(U ;Z)− I(U ;V ),
R1 ≤ I(K;Y |U,A)− I(K;V |U,A),
R0 +R1 ≤ I(U,A,K;Y )− I(U,A,K;V ),
Re ≤ H(Y |Z)},
where pUKAVXY Z(u, k, a, v, x, y, z) = pZ|Y (z|y)pY |X,V (y|x, v)pUKAXV (u, k, a, x, v), which implies that (U,K,A)→
(X,V )→ Y → Z.
The region R(nfo) satisfies R(nf) ⊆ R(nfo).
Remark 6: There are some notes on Theorem 6, see the following.
• The region R(nfo) is convex, and the proof is omitted here.
• The ranges of the random variables U and K satisfy
‖U‖ ≤ ‖X‖‖V‖+ 2,
‖A‖ ≤ (‖X‖‖V‖+ 2)(‖X‖‖V‖+ 1),
‖K‖ ≤ (‖X‖‖V‖+ 2)(‖X‖‖V‖+ 1)(‖X‖‖V‖+ 2)2.
The proof is similar to the proof of the second part of Remark 1, and it is omitted here.
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• Without the secrecy parameter Re, the region R(nfo) is exactly the same as the outer bound for the degraded
broadcast channel with noncausal side information [14].
B. The Model of Figure 2 with Causal Side Information and Feedback
The model of Figure 2 with causal side information and feedback is similar to the model in Subsection III-A,
except that the side information V N is known to the channel encoder in a causal manner, i.e., at the i-th time
(1 ≤ i ≤ N ), the output of the channel encoder xi = fi(s, t, yi−1, vi), where vi = (v1, v2, ..., vi) and fi is the
mapping at time i.
The following Theorem 7 provides the capacity-equivocation region R(cf) for the model of Figure 2 with causal
side information and feedback, and it is proved in Appendix H.
Theorem 7: A single-letter characterization of the capacity-equivocation region R(cf) is as follows,
R(cf) = {(R0, R1, Re) : 0 ≤ Re ≤ R1,
R0 ≤ I(U ;Z),
R1 ≤ I(K;Y |U),
Re ≤ H(Y |Z)},
where pUKVXY Z(u, k, v, x, y, z) = pZ|Y (z|y)pY |X,V (y|x, v)pX|UKV (x|u, k, v)pUK(u, k)pV (v), which implies
that (U,K)→ (X,V )→ Y → Z and V is independent of U and K.
Remark 7: There are some notes on Theorem 7, see the following.
• The region R(cf) is convex, and the proof is omitted here.
• The ranges of the random variables U and K satisfy
‖U‖ ≤ ‖X‖‖V‖+ 1,
‖K‖ ≤ (‖X‖‖V‖+ 1)‖X‖‖V‖.
The proof is similar to the proof of the second part of Remark 1, and it is omitted here.
• Without the secrecy parameter Re, the region R(cf) is exactly the same as the capacity region for the degraded
broadcast channel with causal side information [14], i.e., the noiseless feedback can not increase the capacity
of the degraded broadcast channel with causal side information.
• The points in R(cf) for which Re = R1 are of considerable interest, which imply H(S) = H(S|ZN ).
Definition 10: (The secrecy capacity C(cf)s ) The secrecy capacity C(cf)s of the model of Figure 2 with causal
side information and feedback, is denoted by
C(cf)s = max
(R0=0,R1,Re=R1)∈R(cf)
R1. (3.16)
Furthermore, the secrecy capacity C(cf)s satisfies
C(cf)s = max min{I(K;Y |U), H(Y |Z)}. (3.17)
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Proof of (3.17): Substituting Re = R1 and R0 = 0 into the region R(cf) in Theorem 7, we have
R1 ≤ I(K;Y |U), (3.18)
R1 ≤ H(Y |Z). (3.19)
By using (3.16), (3.18) and (3.19), (3.17) is proved.
• By using the same formula as (3.15), it is easy to see that the feedback helps to enlarge the region R(ci) in
Theorem 3.
IV. A BINARY EXAMPLE FOR THE MODEL OF FIGURE 2 WITH CAUSAL SIDE INFORMATION AND NOISELESS
FEEDBACK
In this section, we calculate the secrecy capacity of a special case of the model of Figure 2 with causal side
information and noiseless feedback.
Suppose that the channel state information V N is available at the channel encoder in a casual manner, and the
random variable V is uniformly distributed over {0, 1}, i.e., pV (0) = pV (1) = 12 . Meanwhile, the random variables
X , Y and Z take values in {0, 1}, and channel 2 is a BSC (binary symmetric channel) with crossover probability
q. The transition probability of channel 1 is defined as follows:
When v = 0,
pY |X,V (y|x, v = 0) =
 1− p, if y = x,p, otherwise. (4.1)
When v = 1,
pY |X,V (y|x, v = 1) =
 p, if y = x,1− p, otherwise. (4.2)
From Remark 7 we know that the secrecy capacity for the causal case is
C(cf)s = max min{I(K;Y |U), H(Y |Z)}. (4.3)
Since R0 = 0, we have U = const, and therefore, I(K;Y |U) = I(K;Y ). The remainder of this example is to
calculate the characters max I(K;Y ) and maxH(Y |Z).
Let K take values in {0, 1}. The probability of K is defined as follows. pK(0) = α and pK(1) = 1− α.
In addition, define the conditional probability mass function pX|K,V as follows.
pX|K,V (0|0, 0) = β1, pX|K,V (1|0, 0) = 1− β1, pX|K,V (0|0, 1) = β2, pX|K,V (1|0, 1) = 1− β2,
pX|K,V (0|1, 0) = β3, pX|K,V (1|1, 0) = 1− β3, pX|K,V (0|1, 1) = β4, pX|K,V (1|1, 1) = 1− β4.
The character I(K;Y ) depends on the joint probability mass functions pKY , and we have
pKY (k, y) =
∑
x,v
pKYXV (k, y, x, v)
=
∑
x,v
pY |XV (y|x, v)pX|K,V (x|k, v)pK(k)pV (v). (4.4)
Now we calculate max I(K;Y ) and maxH(Y |Z), respectively.
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• (Calculation of max I(K;Y )) Since
I(K;Y ) =
∑
k
∑
y
pKY (k, y) log
pKY (k, y)
pK(k)pY (y)
, (4.5)
and
pKY (0, 0) =
α
2
[1− (β1 − β2)(1− 2p)], (4.6)
pKY (0, 1) =
α
2
[1 + (β1 − β2)(1− 2p)], (4.7)
pKY (1, 0) =
α
2
[1− (β3 − β4)(1− 2p)], (4.8)
pKY (1, 1) =
α
2
[1 + (β3 − β4)(1− 2p)]. (4.9)
Define β1 − β2 = a and β3 − β4 = b, then we have
I(K;Y ) ≤ h(1− α− p+ 2pα)− h(p) ≤ 1− h(p), (4.10)
where h(x) = −x log x− (1−x) log(1−x), 0 ≤ x ≤ 1, and the “=” is achieved if a = 1, b = −1 and α = 12 .
• The character H(Y |Z) is calculated as follows.
H(Y |Z) = H(Z|Y ) +H(Y )−H(Z)
≤ H(Z|Y ) = h(q), (4.11)
and therefore, maxH(Y |Z) = h(q). Note that a = 1, b = −1 and α = 12 are also the distributions for
H(Y |Z) = h(q).
Thus, the secrecy capacity of this special case is
C(cf)s = min{1− h(p), h(q)}. (4.12)
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we investigate the model of degraded broadcast channel with side information, confidential messages
and with or without noiseless feedback. This work is from Steinberg’s work on the degraded broadcast channel
with causal and noncausal side information, and Csisza´r and Ko¨rner’s work on broadcast channel with confidential
messages. For the non-feedback model, inner and outer bounds on the capacity-equivocation regions are provided
for both causal and noncausal manners. Superposition coding, Gel’fand-Pinsker’s binning and Wyner’s random
binning technique are used in the corresponding achievability proofs.
For the feedback model, inner and outer bounds on the capacity-equivocation region are provided for the noncausal
case, and the capacity-equivocation region is determined for the causal case. In the corresponding achievability
proofs, the noiseless feedback is used as a secret key shared by receiver 1 and transmitter, and therefore, the coding
schemes for the achievability proofs are a combination of superposition coding, Gel’fand-Pinsker’s binning, block
Markov coding and Ahlswede-Cai’s secret key on the feedback system.
Finally, we give an example on calculating the secrecy capacity of the binary degraded broadcast channel with
causal side information, confidential messages and noiseless feedback.
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APPENDIX A
PROOF OF THEOREM 1
In this section, we will show that any triple (R0, R1, Re) ∈ Rni is achievable. Superposition coding, Gel’fand-
Pinsker’s binning and Wyner’s random binning technique are used in the construction of the code-books.
Now the remainder of this section is organized as follows. The code construction is in Subsection A-A. The
proof of achievability is given in Subsection A-B.
A. Code Construction
Since Re ≤ I(K;Y |U) − I(K;Z|U) and Re ≤ R1 ≤ I(K;Y |U) − I(K;V |U), it is sufficient to show that
the triple (R0, R1, Re = I(K;Y |U)−max(I(K;Z|U), I(K;V |U))) is achievable, and note that this implies that
R1 ≥ Re = I(K;Y |U)−max(I(K;Z|U), I(K;V |U)).
Given a triple (R0, R1, Re), choose a joint probability mass function pU,K,V,X,Y,Z(u, k, v, x, y, z) such that
0 ≤ Re ≤ R1,
R0 ≤ I(U ;Z)− I(U ;V ),
R1 ≤ I(K;Y |U)− I(K;V |U),
Re = I(K;Y |U)−max(I(K;Z|U), I(K;V |U).
The confidential message set S and the common message set T satisfy the following conditions:
lim
N→∞
1
N
log ‖ S ‖= R1 = I(K;Y |U)− I(K;V |U)− γ1, (13)
lim
N→∞
1
N
log ‖ T ‖= R0 = I(U ;Z)− I(U ;V )− γ, (14)
where γ and γ1 are fixed positive real numbers and
0 ≤ γ1 ≤(a) max(I(K;Z|U), I(K;V |U))− I(K;V |U). (15)
Note that (a) is from R1 ≥ Re = I(K;Y |U) −max(I(K;Z|U), I(K;V |U)) and (13). Let S = {1, 2, ..., 2NR1}
and T = {1, 2, ..., 2NR0}.
Code-book generation:
• (Construction of UN ) Gel’fand-Pinsker’s binning technique is used in the construction of UN , see Figure 3.
Generate 2N(I(U ;Z)−1,N ) (1,N → 0 as N → ∞) i.i.d. sequences uN , according to the probability mass
function pU (u). Distribute these sequences at random into 2NR0 = 2N(I(U ;Z)−I(U ;V )−γ) bins such that each
bin contains 2N(I(U ;V )+γ−1,N ) sequences. Index each bin by i ∈ {1, 2, ..., 2NR0}.
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For a given common message t (t ∈ T ) and side information vN , try to find a sequence in bin t
{uN (t, 1), uN (t, 2), ..., uN (t, 2N(I(U ;V )+γ−1,N ))} that is jointly typical with vN , say uN (t, i∗), i.e.,
(uN (t, i∗), vN ) ∈ TNUV (1). If multiple such sequences in bin t exist, choose the one with the smallest i∗. If
no such i∗ exists, then declare an encoding error.
Fig. 3: Code-book construction for UN in Theorem 1
• (Construction of KN ) Classical superposition coding and double binning technique [3] are used in the
construction of KN , see Figure 4.
For the transmitted sequence uN (t, i∗), generate 2N(I(K;Y |U)−2,N ) (2,N → 0 as N → ∞) i.i.d. sequences
kN , according to the probability mass function pK|U (ki|ui(t, i∗)). Distribute these sequences at random into
2NR1 = 2N(I(K;Y |U)−I(K;V |U)−γ1) bins such that each bin contains 2N(I(K;V |U)+γ1−2,N ) sequences. Index
each bin by i ∈ {1, 2, ..., 2NR1}. Then place the 2N(I(K;V |U)+γ1−2,N ) sequences in every bin randomly
into 2N(max(I(K;V |U),I(K;Z|U))−I(K;Z|U)+3,N ) (3,N → 0 as N → ∞) subbins such that every subbin
contains 2N(I(K;V |U)+γ1−2,N−max(I(K;V |U),I(K;Z|U))+I(K;Z|U)−3,N ) sequences. Let J be the random variable
to represent the index of the subbin. Index each subbin by
j ∈ {1, 2, ..., 2N(max(I(K;V |U),I(K;Z|U))−I(K;Z|U)+3,N )}, i.e.,
log ‖J ‖ = N(max(I(K;V |U), I(K;Z|U))− I(K;Z|U) + 3,N ). (16)
Here note that the number of the sequences in every subbin is upper bounded as follows.
I(K;V |U) + γ1 − 2,N −max(I(K;V |U), I(K;Z|U)) + I(K;Z|U)− 3,N
≤(a) I(K;Z|U)− 2,N − 3,N , (17)
where (a) is from (15). This implies that
lim
N→∞
H(KN |UN , S, J, ZN ) = 0. (18)
For a given confidential message s (s ∈ S) and side information vN , try to find a sequence kN (uN (t, i∗)) in
bin s such that (kN (uN (t, i∗)), vN ) ∈ TNKV |U (2). If multiple such sequences in bin s exist, choose the one
with the smallest index in the bin. If no such sequence exists, declare an encoding error.
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Fig. 4: Code-book construction for KN in Theorem 1
• (Construction of XN ) The xN is generated according to a new discrete memoryless channel (DMC) with
inputs kN , uN , vN , and output xN . The transition probability of this new DMC is pX|U,K,V (x|u, k, v), which
is obtained from the joint probability mass function pU,K,V,X,Y,Z(u, k, v, x, y, z). The probability
pXN |UN ,KN ,V N (xN |uN , kN , vN ) is calculated as follows.
pXN |UN ,KN ,V N (x
N |uN , kN , vN ) =
N∏
i=1
pX|U,K,V (xi|ui, ki, vi). (19)
Decoding:
Receiver 2: Given a vector zN ∈ ZN , try to find a sequence uN (tˆ, iˆ) such that (uN (tˆ, iˆ), zN ) ∈ TNUZ(3). If
there exist sequences with the same tˆ, put out the corresponding tˆ. Otherwise, i.e., if no such sequence exists or
multiple sequences have different message indices, declare a decoding error.
Receiver 1: Given a vector yN ∈ YN , try to find a sequence uN such that (uN , yN ) ∈ TNUY (4). If such a sequence
does not exist, or there are more than one such sequence, declare a decoding error. Denote the corresponding
sequence by uN (tˆ, iˆ), put out the corresponding index tˆ.
After decoding uN (tˆ, iˆ) and tˆ, try to find a sequence kN (uN (tˆ, iˆ)) such that (kN (uN (tˆ, iˆ)), yN ) ∈ TNKY |U (5). If
there exist sequences with the same index of the bin sˆ, put out the corresponding sˆ. Otherwise, declare a decoding
error.
B. Proof of Achievability
By using the above definitions, it is easy to verify that limN→∞
log‖T ‖
N = R0 and limN→∞
log‖S‖
N = R1.
Then, note that the above encoding and decoding scheme is similar to the one used in [14]. Hence, by similar
arguments as in [14], it is easy to show that Pe1 ≤  and Pe2 ≤ , and the proof is omitted here. It remains to
show that limN→∞∆ ≥ Re, see the following.
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lim
N→∞
∆ = lim
N→∞
1
N
H(S|ZN )
≥ lim
N→∞
1
N
H(S|ZN , UN )
= lim
N→∞
1
N
(H(S,ZN , UN )−H(ZN , UN ))
= lim
N→∞
1
N
(H(S,ZN , UN , J,KN )−H(J,KN |ZN , UN , S)−H(ZN , UN ))
(a)
= lim
N→∞
1
N
(H(ZN |UN ,KN ) +H(UN , J,KN , S)−H(J,KN |ZN , UN , S)−H(ZN , UN ))
(b)
= lim
N→∞
1
N
(H(ZN |UN ,KN ) +H(UN ,KN )−H(J,KN |ZN , UN , S)−H(ZN , UN ))
= lim
N→∞
1
N
(H(KN |UN )−H(J,KN |ZN , UN , S)− I(ZN ;KN |UN ))
= lim
N→∞
1
N
(H(KN |UN )−H(J |ZN , UN , S)−H(KN |ZN , UN , S, J)− I(ZN ;KN |UN ))
(c)
≥ lim
N→∞
1
N
(H(KN |UN )− log ‖J ‖ −H(KN |ZN , UN , S, J)− I(ZN ;KN |UN ))
≥ lim
N→∞
1
N
(H(KN |UN )−H(KN |UN , Y N )− log ‖J ‖ −H(KN |ZN , UN , S, J)− I(ZN ;KN |UN ))
= lim
N→∞
1
N
(I(Y N ;KN |UN )− log ‖J ‖ −H(KN |ZN , UN , S, J)− I(ZN ;KN |UN ))
(d)
= lim
N→∞
1
N
(NI(Y ;K|U)− log ‖J ‖ −H(KN |ZN , UN , S, J)−NI(Z;K|U))
(e)
= lim
N→∞
1
N
(NI(Y ;K|U)−N max(I(K;V |U), I(K;Z|U)) +NI(K;Z|U)−N3,N −NI(Z;K|U))
(f)
= I(Y ;K|U)−max(I(K;V |U), I(K;Z|U)) = Re, (20)
where (a) is from (S, J)→ (UN ,KN )→ ZN , (b) is from H(J, S|UN ,KN ) = 0, (c) is from H(J |ZN , UN , S) ≤
H(J) ≤ log ‖J ‖, (d) is from that V N , UN , KN and XN are i.i.d. generated random vectors, and the channels
are discrete memoryless, (e) is from (16) and (18), and (f) is from 3,N → 0 as N →∞.
Thus, limN→∞∆ ≥ Re is proved, and the proof of Theorem 1 is completed.
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF THEOREM 2
In this section, we prove Theorem 2: all the achievable (R0, R1, Re) triples are contained in the setR(no). Suppose
(R0, R1, Re) is achievable, i.e., for any given  > 0, there exists a channel encoder-decoder (N,∆, Pe1, Pe2) such
that
lim
N→∞
log ‖ T ‖
N
= R0, lim
N→∞
log ‖ S ‖
N
= R1, lim
N→∞
∆ ≥ Re, Pe1 ≤ , Pe2 ≤ .
Then we will show the existence of random variables (U,K,A)→ (X,V )→ Y → Z such that
0 ≤ Re ≤ R1, (21)
R0 ≤ I(U ;Z)− I(U ;V ), (22)
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R1 ≤ I(K;Y |U,A)− I(K;V |U,A), (23)
R0 +R1 ≤ I(U,K,A;Y )− I(U,K,A;V ), (24)
Re ≤ I(K;Y |U,A)− I(K;V |U,A)− I(K;Z|U) + I(K;V |U). (25)
Since S and T are independent and uniformly distributed over S and T , we have H(S) = log ‖ S ‖ and
H(T ) = log ‖ T ‖. The formulas (22), (23), (24) and (25) are proved by Lemma 1, see the following.
Lemma 1: The random vectors Y N , ZN and the random variables S, T , V , U , K, A, Y , Z of Theorem 2,
satisfy:
1
N
H(T ) ≤ I(U ;Z)− I(U ;V ) + 1
N
δ(Pe2), (26)
1
N
H(S) =
1
N
H(S|T ) ≤ I(K;Y |U,A)− I(K;V |U,A) + 1
N
δ(Pe1), (27)
1
N
H(S, T ) ≤ I(U,K,A;Y )− I(U,K,A;V ) + 1
N
δ(Pe1), (28)
1
N
H(S|ZN ) ≤ I(K;Y |U,A)− I(K;V |U,A)− I(K;Z|U) + I(K;V |U)
+
1
N
δ(Pe1) +
1
N
δ(Pe2), (29)
where δ(Pe1) = h(Pe1) + Pe1 log(|S × T | − 1) and δ(Pe2) = h(Pe2) + Pe2 log(|T | − 1). Note that h(Pe1) =
−Pe1 logPe1 − (1− Pe1) log(1− Pe1) and h(Pe2) = −Pe2 logPe2 − (1− Pe2) log(1− Pe2).
Substituting H(S) = log ‖ S ‖, H(T ) = log ‖ T ‖, H(S, T ) = H(S) + H(T ) and (2.4) into (26), (27), (28)
and (29), and using the fact that  → 0, the formulas (22), (23), (24) and (25) are obtained. The formula (21) is
from
Re ≤ lim
N→∞
∆ = lim
N→∞
1
N
H(S|ZN ) ≤ lim
N→∞
1
N
H(S) = R1.
It remains to prove Lemma 1, see the following.
Proof of Lemma 1: The formula (26) follows from (30), (34) and (44). The formula (27) is from (31), (36)
and (48). The formula (28) is from (32), (38) and (49). The formula (29) is proved by (33), (36), (39), (48) and
(50).
<Part i> We begin with the left parts of the inequalities (26), (27), (28) and (29), see the following.
Since T → Y N → ZN is a Markov chain, for the common message T , we have
1
N
H(T ) =
1
N
H(T |ZN ) + 1
N
I(ZN ;T )
≤(a) 1
N
δ(Pe2) +
1
N
I(ZN ;T ). (30)
For the confidential message S, we have
1
N
H(S) =
1
N
H(S|T ) = 1
N
I(S;Y N |T ) + 1
N
H(S|Y N , T )
≤ 1
N
I(S;Y N |T ) + 1
N
H(S, T |Y N )
≤(b) 1
N
I(S;Y N |T ) + 1
N
δ(Pe1). (31)
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For S and T , we have
1
N
(H(S) +H(T )) =
1
N
H(S, T ) =
1
N
I(S, T ;Y N ) +
1
N
H(S, T |Y N )
≤(c) 1
N
I(S, T ;Y N ) +
1
N
δ(Pe1). (32)
For the equivocation to the receiver 2, we have
1
N
H(S|ZN ) = 1
N
H(S|ZN , T ) + 1
N
I(S;T |ZN )
=
1
N
H(S|T )− 1
N
I(S;ZN |T ) + 1
N
I(S;T |ZN )
=
1
N
I(S;Y N |T ) + 1
N
H(S|Y N , T )− 1
N
I(S;ZN |T ) + 1
N
I(S;T |ZN )
≤ 1
N
I(S;Y N |T )− 1
N
I(S;ZN |T ) + 1
N
H(S, T |Y N ) + 1
N
H(T |ZN )
≤(d) 1
N
I(S;Y N |T )− 1
N
I(S;ZN |T ) + 1
N
δ(Pe1) +
1
N
δ(Pe2). (33)
Note that (a), (b), (c) and (d) follow from Fano’s inequality.
<Part ii> By using chain rule, the character I(ZN ;T ) in formula (30) can be bounded as follows,
1
N
I(ZN ;T ) =
1
N
N∑
i=1
I(Zi;T |Zi−1)
=(1)
1
N
N∑
i=1
(I(Zi;T |Zi−1)− I(Vi;T |V Ni+1))
=
1
N
N∑
i=1
(I(Zi;T, V
N
i+1|Zi−1)− I(Zi;V Ni+1|T,Zi−1)− I(Vi;T,Zi−1|V Ni+1) + I(Vi;Zi−1|T, V Ni+1))
=(2)
1
N
N∑
i=1
(I(Zi;T, V
N
i+1|Zi−1)− I(Vi;T,Zi−1|V Ni+1))
=(3)
1
N
N∑
i=1
(H(Zi|Zi−1)−H(Zi|Zi−1, T, V Ni+1)−H(Vi) +H(Vi|Zi−1, T, V Ni+1))
≤ 1
N
N∑
i=1
(H(Zi)−H(Zi|Zi−1, T, V Ni+1)−H(Vi) +H(Vi|Zi−1, T, V Ni+1)), (34)
where formula (1) follows from that Vi(1 ≤ i ≤ N) are i.i.d. random variables and they are independent of T ,
formula (2) follows from that
N∑
i=1
I(Zi;V
N
i+1|T,Zi−1) =
N∑
i=1
I(Vi;Z
i−1|T, V Ni+1), (35)
and formula (3) follows from that Vi(1 ≤ i ≤ N) are i.i.d. random variables.
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<Part iii> Using chain rule, the character I(S;Y N |T ) in formulas (31) and (33) can be rewritten as follows,
1
N
I(Y N ;S|T ) = 1
N
N∑
i=1
I(Yi;S|Y i−1, T )
=(a)
1
N
N∑
i=1
(I(Yi;S|Y i−1, T )− I(Vi;S|V Ni+1, T ))
=
1
N
N∑
i=1
(I(Yi;S, V
N
i+1|Y i−1, T )− I(Yi;V Ni+1|T, Y i−1, S)− I(Vi;S, Y i−1|V Ni+1, T ) +
I(Vi;Y
i−1|T, S, V Ni+1))
=(b)
1
N
N∑
i=1
(I(Yi;S, V
N
i+1|Y i−1, T )− I(Vi;S, Y i−1|V Ni+1, T ))
=
1
N
N∑
i=1
(H(S, V Ni+1|Y i−1, T )−H(S, V Ni+1|Y i−1, T, Yi)−H(S, Y i−1|V Ni+1, T ) +
H(S, Y i−1|V Ni+1, T, Vi))
=
1
N
N∑
i=1
(H(V Ni+1|Y i−1, T ) +H(S|Y i−1, T, V Ni+1)−H(V Ni+1|Y i−1, T, Yi)−
H(S|Y i−1, T, Yi, V Ni+1)−H(Y i−1|V Ni+1, T )−H(S|V Ni+1, T, Y i−1) +
H(Y i−1|V Ni+1, T, Vi) +H(S|V Ni+1, T, Vi, Y i−1))
=
1
N
N∑
i=1
(I(V Ni+1;Yi|Y i−1, T )− I(Y i−1;Vi|V Ni+1, T ) +
I(S;Yi|Y i−1, T, V Ni+1)− I(S;Vi|Y i−1, V Ni+1, T ))
=(c)
1
N
N∑
i=1
(I(S;Yi|Y i−1, T, V Ni+1)− I(S;Vi|Y i−1, V Ni+1, T ))
=(d)
1
N
N∑
i=1
(I(S;Yi|Y i−1, T, V Ni+1, Zi−1)− I(S;Vi|Y i−1, V Ni+1, T, Zi−1)), (36)
where formula (a) follows from Vi(1 ≤ i ≤ N) are i.i.d. random variables and they are independent of T , S,
formula (b) follows from
N∑
i=1
I(Yi;V
N
i+1|T, Y i−1, S) =
N∑
i=1
I(Vi;Y
i−1|T, S, V Ni+1), (37)
formula (c) follows from (35), and formula (d) is from the Markov chains Yi → (Y i−1, T, V Ni+1) → Zi−1, Yi →
(Y i−1, T, V Ni+1, S)→ Zi−1, Vi → (Y i−1, T, V Ni+1)→ Zi−1 and Vi → (Y i−1, T, V Ni+1, S)→ Zi−1.
<Part iv> Similar to (34), the character I(S, T ;Y N ) in formula (32) can be rewritten as follows,
1
N
I(S, T ;Y N ) ≤ 1
N
N∑
i=1
(H(Yi)−H(Yi|Y i−1, T, S, V Ni+1)−H(Vi) +H(Vi|Y i−1, T, S, V Ni+1)). (38)
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<Part v> Similar to (36), the character I(S;ZN |T ) in formula (33) can be rewritten as follows,
1
N
I(S;ZN |T ) = 1
N
N∑
i=1
I(Zi;S|Zi−1, T )
=
1
N
N∑
i=1
(I(Zi;S|Zi−1, T )− I(Vi;S|V Ni+1, T ))
=
1
N
N∑
i=1
(I(Zi;S, V
N
i+1|Zi−1, T )− I(Zi;V Ni+1|T,Zi−1, S)− I(Vi;S,Zi−1|V Ni+1, T ) +
I(Vi;Z
i−1|T, S, V Ni+1))
=
1
N
N∑
i=1
(I(Zi;S, V
N
i+1|Zi−1, T )− I(Vi;S,Zi−1|V Ni+1, T ))
=
1
N
N∑
i=1
(I(V Ni+1;Zi|Zi−1, T )− I(Zi−1;Vi|V Ni+1, T ) +
I(S;Zi|Zi−1, T, V Ni+1)− I(S;Vi|Zi−1, V Ni+1, T ))
=
1
N
N∑
i=1
(I(S;Zi|Zi−1, T, V Ni+1)− I(S;Vi|Zi−1, V Ni+1, T )). (39)
<Part vi> (single letter) To complete the proof, we introduce a random variable J , which is independent of S,
T , XN , V N , Y N and ZN . Furthermore, J is uniformly distributed over {1, 2, ..., N}. Define
U = (T,ZJ−1, V NJ+1, J), (40)
K = S, (41)
A = (Y J−1, J), (42)
X = XJ , Y = YJ , Z = ZJ , V = VJ . (43)
<Part vii> Then (34) can be rewritten as
1
N
I(T ;ZN ) ≤ 1
N
N∑
i=1
(H(Zi)−H(Zi|Zi−1, T, V Ni+1)−H(Vi) +H(Vi|Zi−1, T, V Ni+1))
=
1
N
N∑
i=1
(H(Zi|J = i)−H(Zi|Zi−1, T, V Ni+1, J = i)−H(Vi|J = i) +H(Vi|Zi−1, T, V Ni+1, J = i))
= H(ZJ |J)−H(ZJ |ZJ−1, T, V ′NJ+1, J)−H(VJ |J) +H(VJ |ZJ−1, T, V
′N
J+1, J)
=(a) H(ZJ |J)−H(ZJ |ZJ−1, T, V NJ+1, J)−H(VJ) +H(VJ |ZJ−1, T, V NJ+1, J)
= H(Z|J)−H(Z|U)−H(V ) +H(V |U)
≤ H(Z)−H(Z|U)−H(V ) +H(V |U)
= I(U ;Z)− I(U ;V ), (44)
where (a) follows from the fact that VJ is independent of J .
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Proof of p(VJ = v, J = i) = p(VJ = v)p(J = i): Since V N is the output of a discrete memoryless source
pV (v), we have
p(Vi = v) = P (V = v). (45)
From <Part vi>, we know that the random variable J is independent of V N , and therefore,
p(VJ = v, J = i) = p(Vi = v, J = i) = p(Vi = v)p(J = i) =
(1) P (V = v)p(J = i), (46)
where (1) follows from (45).
On the other hand, the probability p(VJ = v) can be calculated as follows,
p(VJ = v) =
N∑
i=1
p(VJ = v, J = i) =
N∑
i=1
p(Vi = v, J = i)
=(a)
N∑
i=1
P (Vi = v)p(J = i) =
(b)
N∑
i=1
P (V = v)p(J = i)
= P (V = v)
N∑
i=1
p(J = i) = P (V = v), (47)
where (a) is from that J is independent of V N , the formula (b) is from (45).
By using (46) and (47), it is easy to verify that VJ is independent of J , completing the proof.
Analogously, (36) is rewritten as follows,
1
N
I(Y N ;S|T ) ≤ 1
N
N∑
i=1
(I(S;Yi|Y i−1, T, V Ni+1, Zi−1)− I(S;Vi|Y i−1, V Ni+1, T, Zi−1))
=
1
N
N∑
i=1
(I(S;Yi|Y i−1, T, V Ni+1, Zi−1, J = i)− I(S;Vi|Y i−1, V Ni+1, T, Zi−1, J = i))
= I(S;YJ |Y J−1, T, V NJ+1, ZJ−1, J)− I(S;VJ |Y J−1, T, V NJ+1, ZJ−1, J)
=(a) I(K;Y |U,A)− I(K;V |U,A), (48)
where (a) follows from (40) ,(41), (42) and (43).
Similarly, (38) is rewritten as follows,
1
N
I(S, T ;Y N ) ≤ I(U,K,A;Y )− I(U,K,A;V ), (49)
and (39) can be rewritten as follows,
1
N
I(S;ZN |T ) = I(K;Z|U)− I(K;V |U). (50)
Substituting (44), (48), (49), (50) into (30), (31), (32) and (33), Lemma 1 is proved.
The proof of Theorem 2 is completed.
23
APPENDIX C
SIZE CONSTRAINT OF THE RANDOM VARIABLES IN THEOREM 1
By using the support lemma (see [5], p.310), it suffices to show that the random variables U and K can be replaced
by new ones, preserving the Markovity (U,K)→ (X,V )→ Y → Z and the mutual information I(U ;Z), I(U ;V ),
I(K;Y |U), I(K;V |U), I(K;Z|U), and furthermore, the ranges of the new U and K satisfy: ‖U‖‖ ≤ ‖X‖‖V‖+2,
‖K‖ ≤ (‖X‖‖V‖+ 2)2. The proof is in the reminder of this section.
Let
p¯ = pXV (x, v). (51)
Define the following continuous scalar functions of p¯ :
fXV (p¯) = pXV (x, v), fY (p¯) = H(Y ), fZ(p¯) = H(Z), fV (p¯) = H(V ).
Since there are ‖X‖‖V‖ − 1 functions of fXV (p¯), the total number of the continuous scalar functions of p¯ is
‖X‖‖V‖+2.
Let p¯XV |U = Pr{X = x, V = v|U = u}. With these distributions p¯XV |U = Pr{X = x, V = v|U = u}, we
have
pXV (x, v) =
∑
u∈U
p(U = u)fXV (p¯XV |U ), (52)
I(U ;Z) = fZ(p¯)−
∑
u∈U
p(U = u)fZ(p¯XV |U ), (53)
I(U ;V ) = fV (p¯)−
∑
u∈U
p(U = u)fV (p¯XV |U ), (54)
H(Y |U) =
∑
u∈U
p(U = u)fY (p¯XV |U ), (55)
According to the support lemma ([5], p.310), the random variable U can be replaced by new ones such that the
new U takes at most ‖X‖‖V‖+ 2 different values and the expressions (52), (53), (54) and (55) are preserved.
Once the alphabet of U is fixed, we apply similar arguments to bound the alphabet of K, see the following.
Define ‖X‖‖V‖+ 2 continuous scalar functions of p¯XV :
fXV (p¯XV ) = pXV (x, v), fY (p¯XV ) = H(Y ), fZ(p¯XV ) = H(Z), fV (p¯XV ) = H(V ),
where of the functions fXV (p¯XV ), only ‖X‖‖V‖ − 1 are to be considered.
For every fixed u, let p¯XV |K = Pr{X = x, V = v|K = k}. With these distributions p¯XV |K , we have
Pr{X = x, V = v|U = u} =
∑
k∈K
Pr{K = k|U = u}fXV (p¯XV |K), (56)
I(K;Z|U) = H(Z|U = u)−
∑
k∈K
fZ(p¯XV |K)Pr{K = k|U = u}, (57)
I(K;V |U) = H(V |U = u)−
∑
k∈K
fV (p¯XV |K)Pr{K = k|U = u}. (58)
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I(K;Y |U) = H(Y |U = u)−
∑
k∈K
fY (p¯XV |K)Pr{K = k|U = u}. (59)
By the support lemma ([5], p.310), for every fixed u, the size of the alphabet of the random variable K can not
be larger than ‖X‖‖V‖+ 2, and therefore, ‖K‖ ≤ (‖X‖‖V‖+ 2)2 is proved.
APPENDIX D
PROOF OF THEOREM 3
In this section, we will show that any triple (R0, R1, Re) ∈ Rci is achievable. Superposition coding and Wyner’s
random binning techniques are used in the construction of the code-books.
Now the remainder of this section is organized as follows. The code construction is in Subsection D-A. The
proof of achievability is given in Subsection D-B.
A. Code Construction
Since Re ≤ I(K;Y |U) − I(K;Z|U) and Re ≤ R1 ≤ I(K;Y |U), it is sufficient to show that the triple
(R0, R1, Re = I(K;Y |U) − I(K;Z|U)) is achievable, and note that this implies that R1 ≥ Re = I(K;Y |U) −
I(K;Z|U).
Given a triple (R0, R1, Re), choose a joint probability mass function pU,K,V,X,Y,Z(u, k, v, x, y, z) such that
0 ≤ Re ≤ R1,
R0 ≤ I(U ;Z),
R1 ≤ I(K;Y |U),
Re = I(K;Y |U)− I(K;Z|U).
The confidential message set S and the common message set T satisfy the following conditions:
lim
N→∞
1
N
log ‖ S ‖= R1 = I(K;Y |U)− γ1, (60)
lim
N→∞
1
N
log ‖ T ‖= R0 = I(U ;Z)− γ, (61)
where γ and γ1 are fixed numbers and γ ≥ 0,
0 ≤ γ1 ≤(a) I(K;Z|U). (62)
Note that (a) is from R1 ≥ Re = I(K;Y |U) − I(K;Z|U) and (60). Let S = {1, 2, ..., 2NR1} and T =
{1, 2, ..., 2NR0}.
Code-book generation:
• (Construction of UN )
For a given common message t (t ∈ T ), generate a corresponding sequence uN (t) i.i.d. according to the
probability mass function pU (u).
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Fig. 5: Code-book construction for KN in Theorem 3
• (Construction of KN ) Classical superposition coding and Wyner’s random binning technique [15] are used
in the construction of KN , see Figure 5.
For the transmitted sequence uN (t), generate 2N(I(K;Y |U)−1,N ) (1,N → 0 as N → ∞) i.i.d. sequences
kN , according to the probability mass function pK|U (ki|ui(t)). Distribute these sequences at random into
2NR1 = 2N(I(K;Y |U)−γ1) bins such that each bin contains 2N(γ1−1,N ) sequences. Index each bin by i ∈
{1, 2, ..., 2NR1}.
Here note that the number of the sequences in every bin is upper bounded as follows.
γ1 − 1,N ≤(a) I(K;Z|U)− 1,N , (63)
where (a) is from (62). This implies that
lim
N→∞
H(KN |UN , S, ZN ) = 0. (64)
For a given confidential message s (s ∈ S), randomly choose a sequence kN (uN (t)) in bin s for transmission.
• (Construction of XN ) The xN is generated according to a new discrete memoryless channel (DMC) with
inputs kN , uN , vN , and output xN . The transition probability of this new DMC is pX|U,K,V (x|u, k, v). The
probability pXN |UN ,KN ,V N (xN |uN , kN , vN ) is calculated as follows.
pXN |UN ,KN ,V N (x
N |uN , kN , vN ) =
N∏
i=1
pX|U,K,V (xi|ui, ki, vi). (65)
Decoding:
Receiver 2: Given a vector zN ∈ ZN , try to find a sequence uN (tˆ) such that (uN (tˆ), zN ) ∈ TNUZ(). If there
exists a unique sequence, put out the corresponding tˆ. Otherwise, declare a decoding error.
Receiver 1: Given a vector yN ∈ YN , try to find a sequence uN such that (uN , yN ) ∈ TNUY (). If such a sequence
does not exist, or there are more than one such sequence, declare a decoding error. Denote the corresponding
sequence by uN (tˆ), put out the corresponding index tˆ.
After decoding uN (tˆ) and tˆ, try to find a sequence kN (uN (tˆ)) such that (kN (uN (tˆ)), yN ) ∈ TNKY |U (). If there
exist sequences with the same index of the bin sˆ, put out the corresponding sˆ. Otherwise, declare a decoding error.
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B. Proof of Achievability
By using the above definitions, it is easy to verify that limN→∞
log‖T ‖
N = R0 and limN→∞
log‖S‖
N = R1.
Then, note that the above encoding and decoding scheme is similar to the one used in [14]. Hence, by similar
arguments as in [14], it is easy to show that Pe1 ≤  and Pe2 ≤ , and the proof is omitted here. It remains to
show that limN→∞∆ ≥ Re, see the following.
lim
N→∞
∆ = lim
N→∞
1
N
H(S|ZN )
≥ lim
N→∞
1
N
H(S|ZN , UN )
= lim
N→∞
1
N
(H(S,ZN , UN )−H(ZN , UN ))
= lim
N→∞
1
N
(H(S,ZN , UN ,KN )−H(KN |ZN , UN , S)−H(ZN , UN ))
(a)
= lim
N→∞
1
N
(H(ZN |UN ,KN ) +H(UN ,KN , S)−H(KN |ZN , UN , S)−H(ZN , UN ))
(b)
= lim
N→∞
1
N
(H(ZN |UN ,KN ) +H(UN ,KN )−H(KN |ZN , UN , S)−H(ZN , UN ))
= lim
N→∞
1
N
(H(KN |UN )−H(KN |ZN , UN , S)− I(ZN ;KN |UN ))
≥ lim
N→∞
1
N
(H(KN |UN )−H(KN |UN , Y N )−H(KN |ZN , UN , S)− I(ZN ;KN |UN ))
= lim
N→∞
1
N
(I(Y N ;KN |UN )−H(KN |ZN , UN , S)− I(ZN ;KN |UN ))
(c)
= lim
N→∞
1
N
(NI(Y ;K|U)−H(KN |ZN , UN , S)−NI(K;Z|U))
(d)
= lim
N→∞
1
N
(NI(Y ;K|U)−NI(K;Z|U))
= I(Y ;K|U)− I(K;Z|U) = Re, (66)
where (a) is from S → (UN ,KN ) → ZN , (b) is from H(S|UN ,KN ) = 0, (c) is from that V N , UN , KN and
XN are i.i.d. generated random vectors, and the channels are discrete memoryless, and (d) is from (64).
Thus, limN→∞∆ ≥ Re is proved, and the proof of Theorem 3 is completed.
APPENDIX E
PROOF OF THEOREM 4
In this section, we prove Theorem 4: all the achievable (R0, R1, Re) triples are contained in the setR(co). Suppose
(R0, R1, Re) is achievable, i.e., for any given  > 0, there exists a channel encoder-decoder (N,∆, Pe1, Pe2) such
that
lim
N→∞
log ‖ T ‖
N
= R0, lim
N→∞
log ‖ S ‖
N
= R1, lim
N→∞
∆ ≥ Re, Pe1 ≤ , Pe2 ≤ .
Then we will show the existence of random variables (U,K,A)→ (X,V )→ Y → Z such that
0 ≤ Re ≤ R1, (67)
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R0 ≤ I(U ;Z), (68)
R1 ≤ I(K;Y |U), (69)
Re ≤ I(K;Y |U)− I(K;Z|A). (70)
The formula (67) is from
Re ≤ lim
N→∞
∆ = lim
N→∞
1
N
H(S|ZN ) ≤ lim
N→∞
1
N
H(S) = R1.
Since the model of Figure 2 with causal side information is a special case of the model of Figure 2 with
noncausal side information, the formulas (68), (69) and (70) are obtained from (71), (72) and (73), respectively,
see the following.
Proof of (68): The parameter R0 of (68) can be written as follows,
R0 = lim
N→∞
H(T )
N
≤(a) lim
N→∞
(
1
N
δ(Pe2) +
1
N
N∑
i=1
(H(Zi)−H(Zi|Zi−1, T, V Ni+1)))
≤ lim
N→∞
(
1
N
δ(Pe2) +
1
N
N∑
i=1
(H(Zi)−H(Zi|Y i−1, Zi−1, T, V Ni+1)))
≤(b) lim
N→∞
(
1
N
δ() +H(Z)−H(Z|U))
=(c) I(U ;Z), (71)
where (a) follows from (30) and (34), and Vi is independent of (Zi−1, T, V Ni+1), the formula (b) is from the
definitions U , (T, V NJ+1, Y J−1, ZJ−1, J), Z , ZJ , and the formula (c) follows from  → 0. Thus, the proof of
(68) is completed.
Proof of (69): The parameter R1 of (69) can be written follows,
R1 = lim
N→∞
H(S)
N
≤(1) lim
N→∞
(
1
N
(I(S;Y N |T ) + 1
N
δ(Pe1))
≤ lim
N→∞
(
1
N
I(S;Y N |T ) + 1
N
δ())
≤(2) lim
N→∞
(
1
N
N∑
i=1
I(S;Yi|T, V Ni+1, Y i−1, Zi−1) +
1
N
δ())
≤(3) I(K;Y |U), (72)
where (1) follows from (31), the formula (2) is from (36) and the fact that I(S;Vi|T, V Ni+1, Y i−1, Zi−1) = 0, the
formula (3) is from the definitions U , (T, V NJ+1, Y J−1, ZJ−1, J), K , S, Y , YJ , (J is independent of S,
T , XN , V N , Y N and ZN , and J is uniformly distributed over {1, 2, ..., N}) and the fact that  → 0. Thus, the
formula (69) is proved.
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Proof of (70): The parameter Re of (70) satisfies
Re = lim
N→∞
H(S|ZN )
N
≤(a) lim
N→∞
(
1
N
I(S;Y N |T )− 1
N
I(S;ZN |T ) + 1
N
δ(Pe1) +
1
N
δ(Pe2))
≤(b) lim
N→∞
(
1
N
N∑
i=1
(I(S;Yi|T, V Ni+1, Y i−1, Zi−1)−
I(S;Zi|Zi−1, T, V Ni+1)) +
1
N
δ(Pe1) +
1
N
δ(Pe2))
=(c) I(K;Y |U)− I(K;Z|A), (73)
where (a) follows from (33), the formula (b) is from (36) and (39), and the fact that Vi is independent of
(Zi−1, Y i−1, T, S, V Ni+1), the formula (c) is from the definitions U , (T, V NJ+1, Y J−1, ZJ−1, J), K , S, A ,
(T, V NJ+1, Z
J−1, J), Y , YJ , Z , ZJ , and the fact that Pe1, Pe2 ≤  → 0. Thus, the proof of (70) is completed.
The proof of Theorem 4 is completed.
APPENDIX F
PROOF OF THEOREM 5
In this section, we will show that any triple (R0, R1, Re) ∈ Rnfi is achievable. Superposition coding, Gel’fand-
Pinsker’s binning, block Markov coding and Ahlswede-Cai’s secret key on feedback [1] are used in the construction
of the code-books. In addition, the encoding and decoding scheme for Theorem 5 can be also viewed as a
combination of Steinberg’s method [14], block Markov coding and Ahlswede-Cai’s secret key on feedback [1].
Now the remainder of this section is organized as follows. The code construction is in Subsection F-A. The proof
of achievability is given in Subsection F-B.
A. Code Construction
Given a triple (R0, R1, Re), choose a joint probability mass function pU,K,V,X,Y,Z(u, k, v, x, y, z) such that
0 ≤ Re ≤ R1,
R0 ≤ I(U ;Z)− I(U ;V ),
R1 ≤ I(K;Y |U)− I(K;V |U),
Re ≤ H(Y |Z).
The confidential message set S and the common message set T satisfy the following conditions:
lim
N→∞
1
N
log ‖ S ‖= R1 = I(K;Y |U)− I(K;V |U)− γ1, (74)
lim
N→∞
1
N
log ‖ T ‖= R0 = I(U ;Z)− I(U ;V )− γ, (75)
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where γ and γ1 are fixed positive real numbers. Let S = {1, 2, ..., 2NR1} and T = {1, 2, ..., 2NR0}.
We use the block Markov coding method. The random vectors UN , KN , V N , XN , Y N and ZN consist of n
blocks of length N . The common message for n blocks is Tn , (T1, ..., Tn), which is composed of n i.i.d. random
variables uniformly distributed over T . The confidential message for n blocks is Sn , (S2, S3, ..., Sn), where Si
(2 ≤ i ≤ n) are i.i.d. random variables uniformly distributed over S. Note that in the first block, there is no S1.
Let Z˜i (1 ≤ i ≤ n) be the output of channel 2 for block i, Zn = (Z˜1, ..., Z˜n), Zj = (Z˜1, ..., Z˜j−1, Z˜j+1, ..., Z˜n)
(1 ≤ j ≤ n). Similarly, Y n = (Y˜1, ..., Y˜n), and Y˜i (1 ≤ i ≤ n) is the output of channel 1 for block i. The specific
values of the above random vectors are denoted by lower case letters.
Code-book generation:
• (Construction of UN )
The construction of UN for each block is exactly the same as that in the proof of Theorem 1, see the following.
For the i-th block (1 ≤ i ≤ n), generate 2N(I(U ;Z)−1,N ) (1,N → 0 as N →∞) i.i.d. sequences uN , according
to the probability mass function pU (u). Distribute these sequences at random into 2NR0 = 2N(I(U ;Z)−I(U ;V )−γ)
bins such that each bin contains 2N(I(U ;V )+γ−1,N ) sequences. Index each bin by ti ∈ {1, 2, ..., 2NR0}.
For a given common message ti (ti ∈ T ) and side information vN , try to find a sequence in bin ti
{uN (ti, 1), uN (ti, 2), ..., uN (ti, 2N(I(U ;V )+γ−1,N ))} that is jointly typical with vN , say uN (ti, j∗), i.e.,
(uN (ti, j
∗), vN ) ∈ TNUV (1). If multiple such sequences in bin ti exist, choose the one with the smallest j∗.
If no such j∗ exists, then declare an encoding error.
• (Construction of KN )
Superposition coding, Gel’fand-Pinsker’s binning, block Markov coding and Ahlswede-Cai’s secret key on
feedback [1] are used in the construction of KN , see Figure 6.
For the transmitted sequence uN (ti, j∗), generate 2N(I(K;Y |U)−2,N ) (2,N → 0 as N → ∞) i.i.d. sequences
kN , according to the probability mass function pK|U (ki|ui). Distribute these sequences at random into 2NR1 =
2N(I(K;Y |U)−I(K;V |U)−γ1) bins such that each bin contains 2N(I(K;V |U)+γ1−2,N ) sequences. Index each bin
by l ∈ {1, 2, ..., 2NR1}.
In the first block, for a given side information vN , try to find a kN (uN (t1, j∗)) generated by uN (t1, j∗) such that
(kN (uN (t1, j
∗)), vN ) ∈ TNKV |U (). If multiple such sequences exist, randomly choose one for transmission.
If no such sequence exists, declare an encoding error.
For the i-th block (2 ≤ i ≤ n), firstly we generate a mapping gf : YN → S (note that ‖Y‖N ≥‖ S ‖). Define
a random variable K∗i = gf (Y˜i−1) (2 ≤ i ≤ n), which is uniformly distributed over S, and K∗i is independent
of Si. Reveal the mapping gf to both receivers and the transmitter.
Then, when the transmitter receives the output y˜i−1 of the i-1-th block, he computes k∗i = gf (y˜i−1) ∈ S. For
a given si, the transmitter chooses a sequence kN (uN (ti, j∗)) from the bin si ⊕ k∗i (where ⊕ is the modulo
addition over S) such that (kN (uN (ti, j∗)), vN ) ∈ TNKV |U (). If multiple such sequences in bin si ⊕ k∗i exist,
choose the one with the smallest index in the bin. If no such sequence exists, declare an encoding error.
• (Construction of XN )
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Fig. 6: Code-book construction for KN in Theorem 5, where si and k∗i are the confidential message and the secret
key for block i, respectively.
For each block, the xN is generated according to a new discrete memoryless channel (DMC) with inputs kN ,
uN , vN , and output xN . The transition probability of this new DMC is pX|U,K,V (x|u, k, v). The probability
pXN |UN ,KN ,V N (xN |uN , kN , vN ) is calculated as follows.
pXN |UN ,KN ,V N (x
N |uN , kN , vN ) =
N∏
i=1
pX|U,K,V (xi|ui, ki, vi). (76)
Decoding:
Receiver 2: For each block, given a vector zN ∈ ZN , try to find a sequence uN (tˆ, iˆ) such that (uN (tˆ, iˆ), zN ) ∈
TNUZ(3). If there exist sequences with the same tˆ, put out the corresponding tˆ. Otherwise, i.e., if no such sequence
exists or multiple sequences have different message indices, declare a decoding error.
Receiver 1: For the first block, given a vector y˜1 ∈ YN , try to find a sequence uN such that (uN , y˜1) ∈ TNUY (4).
If such a sequence does not exist, or there are more than one such sequence, declare a decoding error. Denote the
corresponding sequence by uN (tˆ1, jˆ), and put out the corresponding index tˆ1.
For block i (2 ≤ i ≤ n), given a vector y˜i ∈ YN , try to find a sequence uN such that (uN , y˜i) ∈ TNUY (4). If
such a sequence does not exist, or there are more than one such sequence, declare a decoding error. Denote the
corresponding sequence by uN (tˆi, jˆ), put out the corresponding index tˆi.
After decoding uN (tˆi, jˆ) and tˆi, try to find a sequence kN (uN (tˆi, jˆ)) such that (kN (uN (tˆi, jˆ)), y˜i) ∈ TNKY |U (5).
If there exist sequences with the same index of the bin sˆi ⊕ k∗i , put out the corresponding sˆi ⊕ k∗i . Otherwise,
declare a decoding error. Finally, since receiver 1 knows k∗i (k
∗
i = gf (y˜i−1)), put out the corresponding sˆi from
sˆi ⊕ k∗i .
B. Proof of Achievability
The rate of the confidential message Sn is defined as
R∗1 , lim
N→∞
lim
n→∞
H(Sn)
nN
, (77)
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and it satisfies
R∗1 = lim
N→∞
lim
n→∞
H(Sn)
nN
= lim
N→∞
lim
n→∞
∑n
i=2H(Si)
nN
= lim
N→∞
lim
n→∞
(n− 1)H(S)
nN
= R1. (78)
Similarly, the rate of the common messages Tn satisfies
R∗0 , lim
N→∞
lim
n→∞
H(Tn)
nN
= R0. (79)
In addition, note that the encoding and decoding scheme for Theorem 5 is exactly the same as that in [14],
except that the transmitted message for receiver 1 is s⊕ k∗. Since receiver 1 knows k∗, the decoding scheme for
Theorem 5 is in fact the same as that in [14]. Hence, we omit the proof of Pe1 ≤  and Pe2 ≤  here.
It remains to show that limN→∞∆ ≥ Re, see the following.
Since the confidential message S is encrypted by S⊕K∗, the equivocation about S is equivalent to the equivocation
about K∗. There are two ways for receiver 2 to obtain the secret key k∗. One way is that he tries to guess the k∗
from its alphabet S. The other way is that he tries to guess the feedback yN (yN is the output of channel 1 for
the previous block, and k∗ = gf (yN )) from the conditional typical set TN[Y |Z](δ), and this is because for a given
zN and sufficiently large N , Pr{(yN /∈ TN[Y |Z](δ)} → 0. Note that there are 2NH(Y |Z) sequences yN ∈ TN[Y |Z](δ)
when N → ∞ and δ → 0. Therefore, the equivocation about S is min{ log ‖S‖N = R1, H(Y |Z)}, and note that
R1 ≥ Re and H(Y |Z) ≥ Re, then limN→∞∆ ≥ Re is obtained.
The details about the proof are as follows.
First, we will show that K∗i ⊕Si is independent of K∗i and Si, and this is used in the proof of limN→∞∆ ≥ Re.
Since K∗i is independent of Si (2 ≤ i ≤ n), and all of them are uniformly distributed over S, the fact that
K∗ ⊕ Si is independent of K∗ and Si is proved by the following (80) and (81).
Pr{K∗i ⊕ Si = a} =
∑
k∗i ∈S
Pr{K∗i ⊕ Si = a,K∗i = k∗i }
=
∑
k∗i ∈S
Pr{Si = a	 k∗i ,K∗i = k∗i }
=
∑
k∗i ∈S
Pr{Si = a	 k∗i }Pr{K∗i = k∗i }
=
1
‖S‖ . (80)
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Pr{K∗i ⊕ Si = a,K∗i = k∗i } = Pr{Si = a	 k∗i ,K∗i = k∗i }
= Pr{Si = a	 k∗i }Pr{K∗i = k∗i }
=
1
‖S‖2 . (81)
Then, limN→∞∆ ≥ Re is proved by the following (82).
lim
N→∞
∆ , lim
N→∞
lim
n→∞
H(Sn|Zn)
nN
= lim
N→∞
lim
n→∞
∑n
i=2H(Si|Si−1, Zn)
nN
=(a) lim
N→∞
lim
n→∞
∑n
i=2H(Si|Z˜i, Z˜i−1)
nN
≥ lim
N→∞
lim
n→∞
∑n
i=2H(Si|Z˜i, Z˜i−1, Si ⊕K∗i )
nN
=(b) lim
N→∞
lim
n→∞
∑n
i=2H(Si|Z˜i−1, Si ⊕K∗i )
nN
= lim
N→∞
lim
n→∞
∑n
i=2H(K
∗
i |Z˜i−1, Si ⊕K∗i )
nN
=(c) lim
N→∞
lim
n→∞
∑n
i=2H(K
∗
i |Z˜i−1)
nN
=(d) lim
N→∞
lim
n→∞
∑n
i=2 min{NH(Y |Z), NR1}
nN
= lim
N→∞
lim
n→∞
(n− 1) min{NR1, NH(Y |Z)}
nN
= min{R1, H(Y |Z)}
≥ Re, (82)
where (a) is from Si → (Z˜i, Z˜i−1)→ (Si−1, Z˜i−2, Z˜ni+1) is a Markov chain, (b) is from Si → (Si⊕K∗i , Z˜i−1)→ Z˜i
is a Markov chain, (c) follows from the fact that K∗i ⊕Si is independent of K∗i and Z˜i−1, and (d) is from the fact
that receiver 2 can guess the specific vector Y˜i−1 (corresponding to the key K∗i ) from the conditional typical set
TN[Y |Z](δ), and K
∗
i is uniformly distributed over S (K∗i is the key used in block i).
Thus, limN→∞∆ ≥ Re is proved, and the proof of Theorem 5 is completed.
APPENDIX G
PROOF OF THEOREM 6
In this section, we prove Theorem 6: all the achievable (R0, R1, Re) triples are contained in the set R(nfo).
Suppose (R0, R1, Re) is achievable, i.e., for any given  > 0, there exists a channel encoder-decoder (N,∆, Pe1, Pe2)
such that
lim
N→∞
log ‖ T ‖
N
= R0, lim
N→∞
log ‖ S ‖
N
= R1, lim
N→∞
∆ ≥ Re, Pe1 ≤ , Pe2 ≤ .
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Then we will show the existence of random variables (U,K,A)→ (X,V )→ Y → Z such that
0 ≤ Re ≤ R1, (83)
R0 ≤ I(U ;Z)− I(U ;V ), (84)
R1 ≤ I(K;Y |U,A)− I(K;V |U,A), (85)
R0 +R1 ≤ I(U,K,A;Y )− I(U,K,A;V ), (86)
Re ≤ H(Y |Z). (87)
The proof of (83), (84), (85) and (86) are the same as those in the proof of Theorem 2, and therefore, we omit
it here. It remains to prove (87), see the following.
1
N
H(S|ZN ) ≤(a) 1
N
H(S|ZN ) + 1
N
δ(Pe1)− 1
N
H(S|Y N , ZN )
=
1
N
I(S;Y N |ZN ) + 1
N
δ(Pe1)
≤ 1
N
H(Y N |ZN ) + 1
N
δ(Pe1)
≤ 1
N
N∑
i=1
H(Yi|Zi) + 1
N
δ(Pe1)
=(b)
1
N
N∑
i=1
H(Yi|Zi, J = i) + 1
N
δ(Pe1)
= H(YJ |ZJ , J) + 1
N
δ(Pe1)
=(c) H(Y |Z, J) + 1
N
δ(Pe1)
≤ H(Y|Z) + 1
N
δ(), (88)
where (a) is from Fano’s inequality, (b) is from J is independent of Y N and ZN , and (c) is from Y , YJ and
Z , ZJ .
By using limN→∞∆ ≥ Re, ∆ = 1NH(S|ZN ), (88) and letting → 0, the formula (87) is proved.
The proof of Theorem 6 is completed.
APPENDIX H
PROOF OF THEOREM 7
A. Converse Part of Theorem 7
The converse proof of Theorem 7 is exactly the same as the proof of Theorem 4, except that Re ≤ H(Y |Z).
Note that the proof of Re ≤ H(Y |Z) is the same as that in the proof of Theorem 6, and hence we omit the proof
here.
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B. Direct Part of Theorem 7
In this section, we will show that any triple (R0, R1, Re) ∈ Rcf is achievable.
1) Code Construction: Given a triple (R0, R1, Re), choose a joint probability mass function pU,K,V,X,Y,Z(u, k, v, x, y, z)
such that
0 ≤ Re ≤ R1,
R0 ≤ I(U ;Z),
R1 ≤ I(K;Y |U),
Re ≤ H(Y |Z).
The confidential message set S and the common message set T satisfy the following conditions:
lim
N→∞
1
N
log ‖ S ‖= R1 = I(K;Y |U)− γ1, (89)
lim
N→∞
1
N
log ‖ T ‖= R0 = I(U ;Z)− γ, (90)
where γ and γ1 are fixed positive numbers. Let S = {1, 2, ..., 2NR1} and T = {1, 2, ..., 2NR0}.
We use the block Markov coding method. The random vectors UN , KN , V N , XN , Y N and ZN consist of n
blocks of length N . The common message for n blocks is Tn , (T1, ..., Tn), which is composed of n i.i.d. random
variables uniformly distributed over T . The confidential message for n blocks is Sn , (S2, S3, ..., Sn), where Si
(2 ≤ i ≤ n) are i.i.d. random variables uniformly distributed over S. Note that in the first block, there is no S1.
Let Z˜i (1 ≤ i ≤ n) be the output of channel 2 for block i, Zn = (Z˜1, ..., Z˜n), Zj = (Z˜1, ..., Z˜j−1, Z˜j+1, ..., Z˜n)
(1 ≤ j ≤ n). Similarly, Y n = (Y˜1, ..., Y˜n), and Y˜i (1 ≤ i ≤ n) is the output of channel 1 for block i. The specific
values of the above random vectors are denoted by lower case letters.
Code-book generation:
• (Construction of UN )
The construction of UN for each block is exactly the same as that in the proof of Theorem 3, see the following.
For the i-th block (1 ≤ i ≤ n), given a common message ti (ti ∈ T ), generate a corresponding uN (ti) i.i.d.
according to the probability mass function pU (u).
• (Construction of KN )
In the first block, for a given uN (t1), generate a corresponding sequence kN i.i.d. according to the probability
mass function pK|U (ki|ui).
In the i-th block (2 ≤ i ≤ n), firstly we generate a mapping gf : YN → S . Define a random variable
K∗i = gf (Y˜i−1) (2 ≤ i ≤ n), which is uniformly distributed over S, and K∗i is independent of Si. Reveal the
mapping gf to both receivers and the transmitter. Then, when the transmitter receives the output y˜i−1 of the
i-1-th block, he computes k∗i = gf (y˜i−1) ∈ S.
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Given the transmitted sequence uN (ti) and the encrypted confidential message si⊕k∗i (where ⊕ is the modulo
addition over S), generate a corresponding sequence kN i.i.d. according to the probability mass function
pK|U (ki|ui). Index kN by si ⊕ k∗i ∈ S.
• (Construction of XN )
For each block, the xN is generated according to a new discrete memoryless channel (DMC) with inputs kN ,
uN , vN , and output xN . The transition probability of this new DMC is pX|U,K,V (x|u, k, v). The probability
pXN |UN ,KN ,V N (xN |uN , kN , vN ) is calculated as follows.
pXN |UN ,KN ,V N (x
N |uN , kN , vN ) =
N∏
i=1
pX|U,K,V (xi|ui, ki, vi). (91)
Decoding:
Receiver 2: For each block, given a vector zN ∈ ZN , try to find a sequence uN (tˆ) such that (uN (tˆ), zN ) ∈
TNUZ(3). If there exists a unique sequence, put out the corresponding tˆ. Otherwise, declare a decoding error.
Receiver 1: For the first block, given a vector y˜1 ∈ YN , try to find a sequence uN such that (uN , y˜1) ∈ TNUY (4).
If such a sequence does not exist, or there are more than one such sequence, declare a decoding error. Denote the
corresponding sequence by uN (tˆ1), put out the corresponding index tˆ1.
For block i (2 ≤ i ≤ n), given a vector y˜i ∈ YN , try to find a sequence uN such that (uN , y˜i) ∈ TNUY (4). If
such a sequence does not exist, or there are more than one such sequence, declare a decoding error. Denote the
corresponding sequence by uN (tˆi), put out the corresponding index tˆi.
After decoding uN (tˆi) and tˆi, try to find a sequence kN (uN (tˆi)) such that (kN (uN (tˆi)), y˜i) ∈ TNKY |U (5). If
there exists a sequence, put out the corresponding index sˆi⊕k∗i . Otherwise, declare a decoding error. Finally, since
receiver 1 knows k∗i (k
∗
i = gf (y˜i−1)), put out the corresponding sˆi from sˆi ⊕ k∗i .
2) Proof of Achievability: Note that the encoding and decoding scheme for Theorem 7 is exactly the same as
that in [14], except that the transmitted message for receiver 1 is s⊕ k∗. Since receiver 1 knows k∗, the decoding
scheme for Theorem 7 is in fact the same as that in [14]. Hence, we omit the proof of Pe1 ≤  and Pe2 ≤  here.
It remains to show that limN→∞∆ ≥ Re, see the following.
Since the confidential message S is encrypted by S⊕K∗, the equivocation about S is equivalent to the equivocation
about K∗. There are two ways for receiver 2 to obtain the secret key k∗. One way is that he tries to guess the k∗
from its alphabet S. The other way is that he tries to guess the feedback yN (yN is the output of channel 1 for
the previous block, and k∗ = gf (yN )) from the conditional typical set TN[Y |Z](δ), and this is because for a given
zN and sufficiently large N , Pr{(yN /∈ TN[Y |Z](δ)} → 0. Note that there are 2NH(Y |Z) sequences yN ∈ TN[Y |Z](δ)
when N → ∞ and δ → 0. Therefore, the equivocation about S is min{ log ‖S‖N = R1, H(Y |Z)}, and note that
R1 ≥ Re and H(Y |Z) ≥ Re, then limN→∞∆ ≥ Re is obtained.
The detail about the proof of limN→∞∆ ≥ Re is exactly the same as (82), and it is omitted here.
Thus, limN→∞∆ ≥ Re is proved, and the direct part of Theorem 7 is completed.
The proof of Theorem 7 is completed.
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